If the Presidents are just told by their ADs and coaches that “Michigan got caught cheating with an extensive network of spies,” they probably won’t know enough to have better insight into what’s really going on.
The idea that Michigan’s competitors get to decide on Michigan’s head football coach permanently—especially when there is no evidence of his involvement in the conduct at issue—is so flagrantly absurd it almost makes sense to ditch this thing. That said, I sort of trust others here who say it just isn’t financially realistic.
Henschke seems to be saying the larger sanction could take too much time. But it seems to me he could do two games now and simultaneously propose the indefinite suspension in the meantime, with the intent to take care of the formalities during the two-week period. I have no idea if any of this is going to happen but I wouldn’t put too much stock in the reasoning that the need for the vote of the larger committee is going to be a meaningful roadblock.
This is fantastic. It’s really important to do whatever they can to put all this back into its proper context. The video sharing doesn’t even have to be against the rules to make it highly relevant to showing the significance of the conduct here in its full context.
The way I read the provision (and I can’t find a copy of the whole rule book so this is just based on the excerpt) the best reading is that there has to be an investigation before the imposition of sanctions. The part saying that the Commissioner has discretion whether to do a hearing is best read as just meaning that it’s up to the Commissioner whether to go for sanctions, not that he can just unilaterally impose sanctions without investigating claims. In other words, you can’t force the Commissioner to do a hearing, but that’s what the Commissioner has to do if he wants to penalize someone.
I don’t know if it’s relevant to anything but a sanction of the head coach can’t be justified as preventing any ongoing harm. Even accepting the narrative that there was “cheating” whose effects could be ongoing (which it sounds like is the predicate of the complaints here), the only type of remedy that could be relevant to addressing the claimed ongoing harm would be, other than shutting down the entire football program, suspending people who knew the improperly obtained signs of other teams and thus might remember them after the conduct ended and after Stalions left. But I don’t think there’s been any showing that there is any such person. So if the remedy is a suspension of the head coach I don’t see how it could be justified as a preventive measure. And if it’s a punitive measure rather than a preventive measure it’s really unclear why there is such a rush to do it in the heat of the season when it’s plainly going to harm our team in all sorts of ways wholly unrelated to the claimed misconduct.
This may sound snarky, but it’s actually a real question. The word “scout” in the NCAA rules is undefined. If you want to read it broadly enough to capture the conduct alleged against Michigan, it would have to generally involve sending a third party to obtain information about an opponent. So if it’s a violation of 11.6.1 to cause a third party to go attend a public athletic event and look at a team’s signs there, why wouldn’t it also be a violation of the same rule to cause a third party (an investigation firm) to obtain and distribute non-public documents and information about a future opponent? (I understand that we don’t currently have information to support the conclusion that another university actually did that, but I guess this question goes to whether it would be a violation of the rule if that conduct were established.)
This disclosure, if true, could affect the “low-level staffer did it alone” argument. But it doesn’t seem to affect at all the arguments that the conduct did not violate the underlying NCAA rules, I don’t think. Even if the budget was to be paid in university money, which isn’t stated, it isn’t clear that the merits arguments would be impacted.
The university could go to court to challenge an erroneous NCAA decision, but you’re right—the courts seem to be extremely deferential unless you can find some process problem or some exceptional error.
There are interesting questions about whether the reported conduct would violate either of the two rules cited in the media reports. (This analysis is separate from the wisdom, morality, or clumsiness of the reported conduct, of course.)
The first rule, Rule 11.6.1, says that “[o]ff campus, in-person scouting of future opponents (in the same season) is prohibited,” subject to two exceptions. The interpretive issue here is whether the reported conduct (assuming it occurred, of course) constitutes “in-person scouting.” You might think it’s obvious that it is because someone showed up at the game, but bear in mind that the rule governs the conduct of people who are “employed by or associated with member institutions,” 11.01.1,and it may not be the case that anyone employed by or associated with the University attended other teams’ games. You might think that causing someone else to do so would violate the rule, but the fact that the rule only governs “in-person scouting” by covered individuals (i.e., employees or associates of the university) arguably means that scouting that is NOT done directly by those covered employees does not violate the rule. This is supported by the fact that the rules use the term “in-person” many times, and appears to distinguish between an employee showing up him- or herself and acting through an intermediary. So, for example, there are situations where “an institutional coaching staff member may communicate (but not have in-person contact)” with high school students, 13.6.1.2.2(c), suggesting that “in-person” means showing up yourself rather than communicating or obtaining information through an intermediary.
There also seems to be an argument that the reported conduct does not violate the second rule, which addresses the recording of signals. That rule, Article 11(h), specifically governs “game management personnel,” and addresses “[p]rohibited [f]ield [e]quipment,” art. 11. It’s pretty clearly confined to the use of equipment in a game in which the violating party’s team is playing. This is confirmed by the text of the anti-recording rule, which applies only to the attempted recording of “signals given by an OPPOSING” player, coach, or employee. 11(h) (emphasis added). If the institution on whose behalf the recording is done is not playing in the game, it is not an “opposing” team, and so there is no violation. (For example, it was reported that in some game or other, both teams were scouted. It would be counter-intuitive to say that BOTH teams in the same game count as the “opposing” team; neither is playing against the alleged violator.)
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I’m curious how many days it has been since Coach Day promised to “hang 100” on Michigan in the absence of a mercy rule.
If the Presidents are just told by their ADs and coaches that “Michigan got caught cheating with an extensive network of spies,” they probably won’t know enough to have better insight into what’s really going on.
The idea that Michigan’s competitors get to decide on Michigan’s head football coach permanently—especially when there is no evidence of his involvement in the conduct at issue—is so flagrantly absurd it almost makes sense to ditch this thing. That said, I sort of trust others here who say it just isn’t financially realistic.
Henschke seems to be saying the larger sanction could take too much time. But it seems to me he could do two games now and simultaneously propose the indefinite suspension in the meantime, with the intent to take care of the formalities during the two-week period. I have no idea if any of this is going to happen but I wouldn’t put too much stock in the reasoning that the need for the vote of the larger committee is going to be a meaningful roadblock.
This is fantastic. It’s really important to do whatever they can to put all this back into its proper context. The video sharing doesn’t even have to be against the rules to make it highly relevant to showing the significance of the conduct here in its full context.
The way I read the provision (and I can’t find a copy of the whole rule book so this is just based on the excerpt) the best reading is that there has to be an investigation before the imposition of sanctions. The part saying that the Commissioner has discretion whether to do a hearing is best read as just meaning that it’s up to the Commissioner whether to go for sanctions, not that he can just unilaterally impose sanctions without investigating claims. In other words, you can’t force the Commissioner to do a hearing, but that’s what the Commissioner has to do if he wants to penalize someone.
I don’t know if it’s relevant to anything but a sanction of the head coach can’t be justified as preventing any ongoing harm. Even accepting the narrative that there was “cheating” whose effects could be ongoing (which it sounds like is the predicate of the complaints here), the only type of remedy that could be relevant to addressing the claimed ongoing harm would be, other than shutting down the entire football program, suspending people who knew the improperly obtained signs of other teams and thus might remember them after the conduct ended and after Stalions left. But I don’t think there’s been any showing that there is any such person. So if the remedy is a suspension of the head coach I don’t see how it could be justified as a preventive measure. And if it’s a punitive measure rather than a preventive measure it’s really unclear why there is such a rush to do it in the heat of the season when it’s plainly going to harm our team in all sorts of ways wholly unrelated to the claimed misconduct.
This may sound snarky, but it’s actually a real question. The word “scout” in the NCAA rules is undefined. If you want to read it broadly enough to capture the conduct alleged against Michigan, it would have to generally involve sending a third party to obtain information about an opponent. So if it’s a violation of 11.6.1 to cause a third party to go attend a public athletic event and look at a team’s signs there, why wouldn’t it also be a violation of the same rule to cause a third party (an investigation firm) to obtain and distribute non-public documents and information about a future opponent? (I understand that we don’t currently have information to support the conclusion that another university actually did that, but I guess this question goes to whether it would be a violation of the rule if that conduct were established.)
This disclosure, if true, could affect the “low-level staffer did it alone” argument. But it doesn’t seem to affect at all the arguments that the conduct did not violate the underlying NCAA rules, I don’t think. Even if the budget was to be paid in university money, which isn’t stated, it isn’t clear that the merits arguments would be impacted.
The university could go to court to challenge an erroneous NCAA decision, but you’re right—the courts seem to be extremely deferential unless you can find some process problem or some exceptional error.
There are interesting questions about whether the reported conduct would violate either of the two rules cited in the media reports. (This analysis is separate from the wisdom, morality, or clumsiness of the reported conduct, of course.)
The first rule, Rule 11.6.1, says that “[o]ff campus, in-person scouting of future opponents (in the same season) is prohibited,” subject to two exceptions. The interpretive issue here is whether the reported conduct (assuming it occurred, of course) constitutes “in-person scouting.” You might think it’s obvious that it is because someone showed up at the game, but bear in mind that the rule governs the conduct of people who are “employed by or associated with member institutions,” 11.01.1,and it may not be the case that anyone employed by or associated with the University attended other teams’ games. You might think that causing someone else to do so would violate the rule, but the fact that the rule only governs “in-person scouting” by covered individuals (i.e., employees or associates of the university) arguably means that scouting that is NOT done directly by those covered employees does not violate the rule. This is supported by the fact that the rules use the term “in-person” many times, and appears to distinguish between an employee showing up him- or herself and acting through an intermediary. So, for example, there are situations where “an institutional coaching staff member may communicate (but not have in-person contact)” with high school students, 13.6.1.2.2(c), suggesting that “in-person” means showing up yourself rather than communicating or obtaining information through an intermediary.
There also seems to be an argument that the reported conduct does not violate the second rule, which addresses the recording of signals. That rule, Article 11(h), specifically governs “game management personnel,” and addresses “[p]rohibited [f]ield [e]quipment,” art. 11. It’s pretty clearly confined to the use of equipment in a game in which the violating party’s team is playing. This is confirmed by the text of the anti-recording rule, which applies only to the attempted recording of “signals given by an OPPOSING” player, coach, or employee. 11(h) (emphasis added). If the institution on whose behalf the recording is done is not playing in the game, it is not an “opposing” team, and so there is no violation. (For example, it was reported that in some game or other, both teams were scouted. It would be counter-intuitive to say that BOTH teams in the same game count as the “opposing” team; neither is playing against the alleged violator.)