Kalel Mullings and Taylor Upshaw at the Battles around Henderson Field

Submitted by Desmond Was Tripped on November 21st, 2022 at 12:28 PM

 One tends to view the Second World War as an inevitability where weight of numbers smothered the Axis. While this is undoubtedly true, there were times in every theatre where the ability for the Allies to survive long enough for their power of production to enter the equation was in serious jeopardy. Americans tend to view World War 2 as a somewhat short affair. Beginning in the end of December of 1941 (already two years into the war in Europe, and many more in the Pacific), we often forget about the massive and humiliating defeats the US suffered in the Philippines and all over the Pacific until June of 1942 and the Battle of Midway. The casual observer’s (from some of your comments to these Diaries, I know there are no casual observers on MGoBlog) conception of the war then fast forwards to Iwo Jima, or perhaps even the bombing of Japan, with sort of a general understanding that America made progress in between.

In 1942 however, that progress was far from certain. In the latter part of that year, having seen some victories small and large, the United States was ready to go on the offensive against the Japanese. This started at an island called Guadalcanal. Despite the Arsenal of Democracy the United States became in WW2, the Marines and Naval force at Guadalcanal was still a remnant of the inter-war period. Armed with WW1 era rifles, the Marines on the island were under equipped and under supplied to face the Japanese Army that was being sent to push them back into the sea.

Marines at Guadalcanal

 

The war in the Pacific required a harmony between services like very few wars in history before or since. Success required Naval, Air, and Land forces to work together as one. The Marines on Guadalcanal were trusting the Navy to watch their back against the still powerful Japanese fleet. They were let down. Afraid to lose their precious (and insanely valuable) carriers to land based Japanese bombers, the Navy withdrew them from the seas around Guadalcanal, followed closely by the surface ships. The situation was made worse after the Japanese mauled the reamaining US Navy cruisers at the Battle of Savo Island, taking firm control of the seas around Guadalcanal. The US Navy in 1942 was far from what it would later become. Slow to adjust to new technology, slow to replace faulty weapons, and with command and control systems out of synch, the Marines on the island could not count on their support. They would have to do it themselves. For weeks, the Marines were subjugated to attacks not only on the ground and in the air, but also shelling from Japanese battleships behind them. The Marines on the island were cut off, and were forced to fight alone with what they had.

 
IJN Battleship Haruna which shelled Marines at Guadalcanal. With eight 356mm guns. 

 

What they had was pretty good. Most of the armies Japan had faced prior to this were colonial garrison troops, against which they had experienced nothing but success. But on Guadalcanal they faced US Marines. Experienced from wars in China and small brushfires across the world, Marine leaders were the first opponents the Japanese would face with relevant combat experience. Rather than put together a solid strategy, the Japanese lined up like that had for the last half decade of war, and went straight forward. The Marines dug in around their only lifeline, the airstrip called Henderson Field. To lose it meant almost certain death for the Marines on the island, and the great American offensive in the Pacific would fail.


Marine Officers at Guadalcanal. could Play ILB at Wisconsin with that jaw

 

Three times the Japanese lined up and came right at the Marines on Guadalcanal. First at the Tenaru, the 900 men of the 31st IJA Infantry Regiment slammed into 3,000 of the US Marine 1st Infantry Regiment. The Marines were ready, they were prepared, they knew what was coming, and stopped the Japanese in their tracks.

In their arrogance, the Japanese infantry would try two more front assaults over the coming weeks. First at Edson’s Rudge and then at a place called the Matanikau. They ran right into the teeth of the best warriors America had to offer, and were shattered. The Japanese had squandered their chance for victory by underestimating their opponents, and given away the initiative to their enemy, who would never give it back.

 

For whatever reason, (and there are many) the offense against Illinois was broken. Much like the US Navy in 1942, they were missing some pieces, and were unable (or unwilling) to change their concept on the fly to fit their new realities. This diary is not about how poorly the offense played, and I do not know nearly enough to even begin to dissect that. This diary is about how when they were left by themselves, with a perfect season on the line and all of their goals in front of them, the Michigan defense stepped up on four plays (one penalty) and held the line.

Illinois needed one first down. Ten Yards. An Illinois who hasn’t beaten a team inside the Top 3 since 2007, (beat #1 OSU!!). An Illinois who lost to Michigan State. They had victory in their grasp, and the Michigan Defense simply refused to let them close their fists around it. For one series, the Michigan defense flexed to what it had been in the second half of every game all season, an unbreakable wall.

Earlier in the year, we discussed Kalel Mullings on defense. He struggled, pretty hard. But one of the beautiful things about college football is it allows young men to find a role and excel in it. While Mullings may be a running back in the future, for now he is a linebacker. When his team needed him, they put him in position and gave him a task he could excel at. Use your size and stop the run, (he did over pursue on the penalty scramble, ok, play didn’t count).   While it is far from a redemption arc (he’s young, he will develop), it is amazing to see a young man who has struggled so much throughout the year know his team trusts him. To know that when all of their collective dreams are on the line, he is one of the 11 men they will count on.

The second hero was Taylor Upshaw. A 3 Star Graduate Student, Taylor Upshaw is a quintessential Michigan Man. He’s seen game action, but has never been a star. He has worked his way up, never quitting, doing the work to make himself and Michigan what they are. He is in his fifth year in the program, and has stayed behind some of the best players at his position Michigan has EVER had. He has stayed, and on the last play of Illinois’ attempt to seal the upset, he made the 3rd down tackle. He shut the door on Illinois, and have his offense one more shot. He stayed, and he is a champion.

Beat Ohio.  

Comments

LB

November 21st, 2022 at 12:38 PM ^

Colonel Edson simply said, “It is useless to ask ourselves why it is we are here. We
are here. There is only us between the airfield and the Japs. If we don’t hold, we will lose Guadalcanal.”

Baldbill

November 21st, 2022 at 12:51 PM ^

As a veteran Marine, I love the Guadalcanal reference. Lots of the fighting was hand to hand, at night, the marines were strung out along the ridge lines and told to hold at all cost. They did. 

Beat OSU.

dragonchild

November 21st, 2022 at 1:07 PM ^

I dunno, I got a case to make against it.

Every front of every war has a battleground that becomes a microcosm of the war itself -- a point where both sides realize it comes down to this, and the outcome of the battle decides the war.  It's often a deliberately forgotten point, in fact, because it's invariably so bloody and expensive that governments can't use them for propaganda.  Much easier to pick a "dastardly" ambush or a resounding success.  Whether you're selling a war or whitewashing one, it's tough to fit "we lost over two dozen ships taking an airfield" into a pretty dress, even if you know it was necessary.

For the European theatre in WW2, the "point" was Stalingrad.  Not that other parts were easy by any means, but for example, Operation Overlord (i.e, Normandy) resulted in about half a million casualties including WIA, MIA, and POWs.  Stalingrad was two million; entire armies were wiped out trying to take a single city.  For the Pacific, it wasn't Pearl Harbor ("the ambush") or Iwo Jima (hell) or Okinawa (more hell) or even Midway ("the success").  It was Guadalcanal.

Guadalcanal was Japan's lifeline both in terms of access to resources and access to targets.  They threatened the entire South Pacific by holding it.  The U.S. and Japan poured so much into the battle that the seas around Guadalcanal are called Ironbottom Sound:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironbottom_Sound#/media/File:Wrecks_in_the_Ironbottom_Sound.jpg

Michigan was playing to get through the week to Ohio State, so Illinois most certainly wasn't "the point".  If anything, Guadalcanal is most likely this week.

Desmond Was Tripped

November 21st, 2022 at 1:40 PM ^

This analogy is much more true of modern industrial war that it was even a hundred years before. Strategy that relies on attrition often mathematically come down to a part of the equation where time=victory. WW2 was like this. Germany wouldn't have won if it took Stalingrad, but it sure lost because it didn't. Likewise the US could have regrouped and tried again with the massive military it was putting together, and almost certainly would have. That was part of the calculus behind pulling the fleet from Guadalcanal. You simply had to save it more than you had to save the Marines or the Island. The US in those early years rightfully prioritized the carriers more than anything, because they knew to beat Japan they needed to buy time, and that the carriers bought them that. 

Like saturday, Guadalcanal was a nice to have for the Americans, but an absolute must for the Japanese. Illinois HAD to win to go to the B10 Championship. Michigan really WANTED to win, but could possibly have gone on without it.  

hfhmilkman

November 22nd, 2022 at 9:50 AM ^

What was essential to the Japanese that Guadalcanal was a "lifeline"?  Guadalcanal had consequences for the security of Australia.  The co-prosperity sphere was secure.

There are also historians that view the Pacific war as a sideshow.   This is not to belittle the hard fighting that was done, just that even the Japanese high command knew that the final result was not in doubt if the Americans had the will to see it through.  Unlike a football game that has a defined end, wars do not.  The only question for the Japanese was how long would it take for them to lose.

The real inflection point in my opinion was Midway.  If Japan had scored a decisive victory the United States would have had to prioritize defense.  That might have bought the Japanese a couple more years. 

getsome

November 21st, 2022 at 3:21 PM ^

all good programs need those upshaw type dudes.  you hope they dont have to play 50 snaps but if they do, theyll know their responsibilities. 

for those who maybe havent read as much on WWII or dont have huge interest id still recommend watching at least the beginning of the pacific series on hbo.  they nail guadalcanal about as well as hollywood could

Sam1863

November 21st, 2022 at 7:00 PM ^

Had an uncle who was on Guadalcanal. He came away from that battle with three things: the immense pride of being a Marine; a lifelong hatred of the Japanese; and a permanent disgust at the sight of rice. They had to survive on the captured Japanese rations, and he swore if he ever got off that island, he'd never touch that shit again. To my knowledge, he never did.

charblue.

November 21st, 2022 at 11:54 PM ^

My dad who passed away at 97 last October was a proud Marine who served in both WWII and Korean War. Luckily he never saw combat.

But he was part of the original 2nd Marine Division occupation force that entered Nagasaki after the second nuclear blast was ordered to end the Pacific conflict on Aug. 9 1945, three days after the first nuclear bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. 

Japan Emperor Hirohito finally agreed to surrender six days after the Nagasaki strike. The 27,000 Marine force didn't enter the leveled city until 45 days after the bombing. And changing Marine units remained in occupation of the city until July 1946. My dad didn't stay there but a few days with his Headquarters Company, part of the 8th Engineer Battalion. 

My dad had enlisted in the Marines as part of a V-12 officer training program while attending Muhlenberg College in Allentown, Pa., in 1943. He wrote about his military experience as part of a two-volume self-published account of his life that he produced as a record of family heritage that he completed a year before his death.   

His Marine contingent left San Diego on Aug. 21, 1945 for the Pacific without an announced destination. "We were aware that both atomic bombs had been dropped and Japan had surrendered one week earlier. It was not known definitely that the Pacific waters had been secured. We learned we were going to Guam which was now the supply base and center of operations for the Pacific Theater. It had been taken back by the Marines in July 1944," he wrote.

With Japan's surrender officially signed on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on Labor Day, Sept. 2, 1945, the Nagasaki occupation began nine days later. "The city was completely devastated, in ruins, and still showing charred remnants with steel framed buildings twisted like pretzels. We were billeted in one. Our reason for being there was primarily to make sure it was secured," he wrote. 

"From Nagasaki, we moved to the northern end of Kyushyu to the port city of Fukuoka were we would be stationed for six months. My platoon was assigned MP duty, and I was in charge of the motor pool," he added. 

Clearly the reason why Marines were deployed for short durations was to limit radiological exposure levels. 

AlbanyBlue

November 21st, 2022 at 8:17 PM ^

Another excellent diary. These are some of my favorite pieces on the site. 

Like with the Marines on Guadalcanal, there was an implied (hopeful, of course, but still) expectation that our defense would succeed. Because they have superior talent, were in position to succeed, and, most of all, because they had to. 

Of course, it helped that Illinois was inferior, just as the Japanese troops were. 

Let's not leave it up to a defensive stand against OSU. Let's take their heart early on and roll.

treetown

November 22nd, 2022 at 4:10 PM ^

Worth reading more about.

Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle, Penguin, 1992. Probably the most accessible and readily available secondary narrative of the air, land and naval battle for Guadalcanal.

Samuel Eliot Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1941: volume 5, History of US Naval Operations in WWII. 2010 Naval Institute Press Edition, (original version 1950s). Morison was a friend of FDR and a historian at Harvard. He was able to interview many of the naval leaders and and was on scene in many of the actual events. His work came out in the 1950s in 14 some volumes.

The 2010 version has foreword and notes by noted historians, that elaborate on issues that Morison did not discuss – namely the important of role of intelligence, not just code breaking but radio traffic analysis. Morison clearly was aware of these but chose not to discuss them probably at the request of the US Navy.

David C. Evans (ed), The Japanese Navy in World War II, Naval Institute Press, 2017, Chapters on The Battle of Savo Island -arguably the worst defeat suffered by the US Navy in its whole history, and the closest that the IJN came to repelling the landing (Admiral Mikawa) and the Guadalcanal supply runs (Admiral Tanaka) are particularly interesting. Interviewed soon after the war, and perhaps a bit self-serving, they nonetheless shed light on the complexity of the relationship between the IJN and IJA (Imperial Japanese Navy and Army respectively).

John Prados, Islands of Destiny, Dutton Caliber, 2012.

John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, Random House, 1995

These works delve deeper into the role that decoding and radio intercepts played in the Guadalcanal campaign and the Pacific War, when it was possible to more fully discuss them. They showed that there was many layers to the role of intelligence and not just decoding one code.

Martin Clemens, Alone on Guadalcanal, Naval Institute Press, 2013. Australian coast watchers played an important human intelligence role and were an early warning network of Japanese naval and air movements in 1941-1942. These were British and Australian colonial officials who went into hiding on the Solomon islands at great personal peril and used short wave sets to communicate details about shipping and air activity. Clemens was at Guadalcanal helped to provide intelligence from his contact with the indigenous natives.

Senshi Sosho aka Kokan Senshi which is the official military history of Imperial Japan’s involvement in the war (1937-1945) 102 volumes published from 1966 to 1980. It is largely untranslated, except for translations paid for by groups (Dutch and Australian) that focused on their area of interest. Volume 3 – occupation of the Dutch East Indies, Volume 26, Naval Operations in Dutch Indies and Bay of Bengal, Volume 14, Army Operations in the South Pacific: Port Moresby to the First Phase of Guadalcanal, Volume 28 Army Operations in the South Pacific: Guadalcanal – Buna operations. Very hard to find unfortunately – I’ve only been able to read excerpts, but shows the shoe string logistics and split demands on the IJA HQ in Rabaul – trying to mount an offensive to take Port Moresby over the Owen Stanley mountain range in eastern New Guinea (13,000 feet altitude – perspective Appalachian range peak is 6,687 feet) and also retake Guadalcanal. The weather and trails were so rough that horses were not viable as a method of transport and a lot of supplies had to ported up. Like Waterloo and Wavre, part of understanding the Guadalcanal campaign requires understanding what was happening at the same time in New Guinea.

grumbler

November 22nd, 2022 at 8:37 PM ^

An even more apt analogy might be the First naval Battle of Guadalcanal, where a scratch force of 14 US cruisers and destroyers turned back 14 well-drilled Japanese ships including two battleships.  The battleships were intent on reenacting the previous battleship bombardment mentioned in the story.

The "second string" US forces turned back the Japanese, as the second-string Wolverines did Illinois,  but, like Michigan, suffered losses along the way.  By the end of 13 November the USN had lost 1439 dead in the battle.  To put that in perspective, the Marines lost 1152 KIA/DoW in the whole campaign.

On November 14th, though, the USN crushed the Buck... er, the Japanese in the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.